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THE TWILIGHT OF NATIONAL LAND USE
POLICY
FRED BOSSELMAN*
I.

INTRODUCTION

In the early 1970s, Congress came within a few votes of
adopting a bill called the National Land Use Policy Act. Few
people today recall the debates over this proposal, and most people
today would probably be surprised to learn that a Republican
president was promoting this expansion of federal power. At that
time, however, the popular mood was quite different than what we
find today.
This Article provides a brief review of the debates over land
use policy that took place four decades ago. In metropolitan areas,
three interest groups were particularly unhappy with the
regulation of land development by local governments, and
welcomed intervention at a higher level: (1) civil rights groups
were concerned about the need for affordable housing near
suburban jobs; (2) business interests supported facilities needed
for regional growth; and (3) conservation groups feared loss of open
space.
The proposed National Land Use Policy Act was designed to
attract support from all of these interest groups, but each group
had its own ideas about what national land use policy should be.
To gather such support, the writers of the Act tried to offer no clue
to what national policy would actually be if the bill was enacted,
hoping that each interest group could support the bill on the
assumption that its own idea of a good national policy would have
universal appeal.
Although opponents raised objections to loss of local power
and interference with property rights, what defeated the
legislation-and the very idea of a national land use policy-was
the realization that the increasing globalization of the world
economy prevented any nation from truly controlling its own land
use policy. Since then, the United States has been responding to
the policies of other nations without forming any overall land use
policy of its own.

* Professor of Law Emeritus, Chicago-Kent College of Law.
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THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION

The 1960s had been the decade of what Cass Sunstein calls
the "rights revolution" because "Congress and the President
invoked the rhetorical power of the civil rights movement on
behalf of causes involving not only discrimination on various
grounds, but also the environment, workers, the poor, and even
consumers."' During his term of office, President Johnson presided
over the greatest expansion of public control of decisions, which
were previously controlled by market forces, since the presidency
of Franklin Roosevelt. 2 Congress gave much of that power to
federal agencies, partly to counteract suspicion of the civil rights
records of some state governments. 3 By delegating an
unprecedented degree of rulemaking authority to these agencies, 4
the new laws created "an administrative and legislative tangle
that made Kennedy's Washington seem a place of Greek
simplicity."5
One of the most troublesome issues for civil rights groups was
the migration of employers from the central cities to suburban
areas far from the existing homes of most minority group
members.6 Urban unrest contributed to a fear that central cities
were likely to become more and more undesirable locations for
growth. 7 Businesses were escaping to the suburbs, leaving many
minorities stranded in an area of declining jobs, but the suburbs
that were eager to attract businesses were not providing housing
that most minority group members could afford.8
The federal government had little control over local land use
decisions, and was reluctant to become involved, despite persistent
attacks on local tactics to exclude minorities through "exclusionary
zoning."9 Critics argued that local land use regulation was used
1. CASS R. SUNSTEIN, AFTER THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION: RECONCEIVING

THE REGULATORY STATE 24-25 (Harvard Univ. Press 1990).
2. OTIS L. GRAHAM, JR., TOWARD A PLANNED SOCIETY: FROM ROOSEVELT

TO NIXON 140 (Oxford Univ. Press 1976).
3. DAVID R. GODSCHALK, INTRODUCTION TO PLANNING IN AMERICA:
LEARNING FROM TURBULENCE 1, 4 (David. R. Godschalk ed., 1974).

4. See Lester B. Lave, Health, Safety, and Environmental Regulations, in
SETTING NATIONAL PRIORITIES: AGENDA FOR THE 1980S 131, 139 (Joseph A.

Pechman ed., 1980) (discussing how the 1977 amendments to the Clean Air
Act required the EPA to create new standards to protect air quality).
5. GRAHAM, supra note 2, at 176.
6. See generally LOUISE A. MOZINGO, PASTORAL CAPITALISM: A HISTORY
OF SUBURBAN CORPORATE LANDSCAPES (2011) (discussing how corporations

moved from central cities to America's suburbs).
7. REPORT OF THE NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS
390-91 (Bantam ed., 1968).
8. See generally THE GEOGRAPHY OF OPPORTUNITY: RACE AND HOUSING

CHOICE IN METROPOLITAN AMERICA (Xavier de Souza Briggs ed., 2005)
(discussing the effects of social segregation).
9. ADVISORY COMM'N ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, URBAN AND
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"by the people who already lived within the arbitrary boundaries
of a community as a method of keeping everybody else out.
Apartments, factories, and 'blight,' euphemisms for blacks and
people of limited means, were rigidly excluded." 0 Although some
scholars advocated for a constitutional "right" to housing, they had
little success."
Most states delegated the power to control land use to local
governments, and those powers were largely unaffected by federal
rights legislation. Existing state land use laws were procedural in
nature, addressing issues such as public hearings, notice to
neighbors, opportunities for variances, and judicial review; they
made little attempt to tell local governments what kind of land
uses to encourage or discourage. 12 The assumption was that, if the
local governments followed proper procedures, they would make
wise decisions; but the reality was that "local governments
represent[ed] the people already there," not the rest of the
country's mobile and expanding population. 13

III.

REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT

Business interests tended to see metropolitan areas from a
different perspective. They prospered from growth of the
metropolitan area, and resented local opposition to land uses
necessary to accommodate regional growth, such as freeways,
sewage treatment plants, and power lines. The developers of
locally unwanted land uses 4 argued that the construction of
necessary infrastructure was prevented by a local attitude called
"not in my back yard," or "nimby," as it became widely known.' 5
These groups sought state or federal override of local objections to
necessary regional facilities.' 6
Some people advocated major changes in federal policy to
overcome suburban resistance, such as the construction of new

RURAL AMERICA: POLICIES FOR FUTURE GROWTH 58-59 (1968).
10. KENNETH T. JACKSON, CRABGRASS FRONTIER: THE SUBURBANIZATION
OF THE UNITED STATES 242 (Oxford Univ. Press 1985).

11. See Why a Right to Housing Is Needed and Makes Sense, Editor's
Introduction to A RIGHT TO HOUSING: FOUNDATION FOR A NEW SOCIAL
AGENDA 1, 1-2 (Rachel G. Bratt et al. eds., 2006) (discussing the benefits of
establishing a right to housing).
12. RICHARD F. BABCOCK, THE ZONING GAME: MUNICIPAL PRACTICES AND
POLICIES 153-54 (Univ. of Wis. Press 1966).
13. THE TASK FORCE ON LAND USE AND URBAN GROWTH, THE USE OF
LAND: A CITIZENS' POLICY GUIDE TO URBAN GROWTH 225 (Wiliam K. Reilly
ed., 1973).
14. See DOLORES HAYDEN, A FIELD GUIDE TO SPRAWL 54 (2004) (referring
to a landfill and dump in Zapata, Texas as a "LULU").
15. REILLY, supra note 13, at 239.
16. Id. at 246-48.

240

The John MarshallLaw Review

[45:237

towns' 7 or the encouragement of new development in rural regions
far removed from "megapolitan areas."' 8 But despite some
tentative moves in these directions, the government was not
prepared to force such drastic changes.
Property rights groups formed to try to persuade the courts to
back the rights of landowners to develop their land in the way that
they chose, but the complexity of the issue defied simple
solutions.19 Local governments, under pressure from angry voters,
continued to reject unwanted development no matter how
adversely landowners were affected. The real decision maker in
suburban land use decisions was often the hostile audience. 20
IV. ENVIRONMENTAL ACTIVISM
The late 1960s had also seen the beginning of a nationwide
movement that viewed "pollution" as a technologically-generated
evil that needed to be punished. 21 Conservationists who worried
about the loss of open space merged with groups concerned about
pollution and began using a new term-"environmentalist." 22
Environmental groups argued that local governments were often
thwarting national environmental objectives. 23 Whereas civil
rights advocates used terms such as "exclusionary zoning" to
describe local efforts to prevent construction of low-income
housing, 24 and urged new legislation to limit those efforts, 25 it was
often the environmental groups that spearheaded new state limits
on local land use decision making. 26
Environmental advocates began to use the term "urban
sprawl" to describe the unwillingness of local governments to
protect ecologically vital areas.27 Never easy to define, sprawl was
originally a term used by engineers and economists to deplore the
17. ADVISORY COMM'N ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, supra note 9,
at 62.
18. NAT'L GOALS RESEARCH STAFF, TOWARD BALANCED GROWTH:
QUANTITY WITH QUALITY 47, 60 (Leonard Garment ed., 1970).
19. JAMES W. ELY, THE GUARDIAN OF EVERY OTHER RIGHT: A
CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF PROPERTY RIGHTS 154-55 (2d ed. 1998).
20. BABCOCK, supra note 12, at 140-41.
21. BARRY COMMONER, THE CLOSING CIRCLE: NATURE, MAN, AND
TECHNOLOGY 177 (1971).
22. ADAM ROME, THE BULLDOZER IN THE COUNTRYSIDE: SUBURBAN
SPRAWL AND THE RISE OF AMERICAN ENVIRONMENTALISM 139 (2001).
23. NOREEN LYDAY, THE LAW OF THE LAND: DEBATING NATIONAL LAND
USE LEGISLATION 1970-1975 17-18 (1976).
24. See ROBERT G. HEALY, LAND USE AND THE STATES 24-25 (2d ed. 1979)

(describing how communities would use housing prices and zoning laws to
exclude the poor and working class).
25. LYDAY, supra note 23, at 22.
26. JOHN M. DEGROVE, LAND, GROWTH, AND POLITICS 371 (1984).
27. COUNCIL ON ENVTL. QUALITY, ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY: THE SECOND
ANNUAL REPORT OF THE COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY 61 (1971).
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fiscal and social impacts of "the wasteful pattern of urban
particularly
disliked
scatteration." 28
These
technicians
"leapfrogging," by which developers skipped over the vacant land
most easily connected to existing infrastructure to build on more
distant and cheaper land that required costlier services. 29 But
until the idea of sprawl was picked up by environmental
advocates, it had little influence. 30
The environmental movement focused on the impact of
suburban sprawl on natural areas that were quickly disappearing,
such as wetlands, hillsides, and flood plains.3 1 By focusing on
visual images of land to be protected, environmental advocates
garnered broader support than had been given to those who made
more technical arguments based on engineering, aesthetics, and
recreation. 32 Like the other groups, however, environmentalists
found that "[o]ne of the most persistent and intractable roadblocks
to environmental objectives was land development," which
remained under local control.3 3 So as the '60s ended, three
different interest groups were looking for ways to modify local land
use practices, with different objectives in mind.
V.

RICHARD NIXON, ENVIRONMENTALIST?

President Nixon took office in 1969, and during his first term
(1969-1973) the federal government enacted a wide range of new
environmental legislation, much of which remains as key
components of today's environmental law.3 4 Nixon surprised
environmentalists by taking the offensive, "insist[ing] that his
administration was leading the public crusade to stop
environmental abuse."35 "Nixon wanted to be seen as a new
Theodore Roosevelt, a Republican champion of efficiency and
technological improvement" who would bring peace between
human development and nature.3 6
selected noted Republican
In 1970, the President
conservationist, Russell Train, as Chairman of the Council on
Environmental Quality ("CEQ"), an agency that had been
28. ADVISORY COMM'N ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, supra note 9,
at 60.

29. HAYDEN, supra note 14, at 56.
30. See ROME, supra note 22, at 229 (discussing how some local
governments refused to regulate land use and, even when they did, their
efforts were inadequate).
31. Id. at 154-81.
32. Id. at 128-29.
33. SAMUEL P. HAYS, A HISTORY OF ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS SINCE 1945
66(2000).
34. ROBERT GOTTLIEB, FORCING THE SPRING: THE TRANSFORMATION OF
THE ENVIRONMENTAL MOVEMENT 128 (1993).
35. GRAHAM, JR., supranote 2, at 214.
36. GOTTLIEB, supra note 34, at 109.
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authorized by the new National Environmental Policy Act. 37 This
was seen as an auspicious beginning because Train combined
"involvement in protecting the environment with political,
administrative, and social skills unmatched in the [conservation]
movement since Gifford Pinchot."3 8
The President also used a reorganization plan to merge parts
of existing cabinet departments into a new agency, the
Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA"), which consolidated the
federal power to enforce national environmental standards. 39 New
pollution control legislation granted both CEQ, and especially
EPA, wide discretion in setting standards. 40
VI. NATIONAL LAND USE POLICY PROPOSALS
The anti-exclusion, anti-"nimby," and anti-sprawl groups
shared a common desire to weaken local governments' land use
control powers; but because these groups had different and often
conflicting objectives, they found it difficult to convince federal
policymakers to confront the longstanding power of local
governments to make land use decisions. 4' Nevertheless, federal
policymakers wanted to respond to public concern about local
policieS42 without direct federal exercise of land use regulations, so
they began to search for politically feasible means of using federal
leverage to persuade the states to exercise more influence on local
land use decisions. 43
Senator Henry Jackson, a powerful centrist Democrat from
the State of Washington, 44 "opened the debate in January 1970 by
proposing a National Land Use Policy Act" that offered grants to
states that would adopt powerful statewide land use plans.45 He
tried to avoid the risky political strategy of direct federal
involvement in land use decisions; instead, he hoped to encourage
the state governments to reclaim their inherent authority to adopt
land use plans at a level above that of the local communities, and
to accomplish this without demanding state compliance with
46
substantive federal standards.
37. J. BROOKS FLIPPEN, CONSERVATIVE CONSERVATIONIST: RUSSELL E.
TRAIN AND THE EMERGENCE OF AMERICAN ENVIRONMENTALISM 87 (2006).
38. PHILIP SHABECOFF, A FIERCE GREEN FIRE: THE AMERICAN
ENVIRONMENTAL MOVEMENT 102 (1993).
39. GOTTLIEB, supra note 34, at 129; SHABECOFF, supra note 38, at 130.
40. Lave, supra note 4, at 137.
41. LYDAY, supra note 23, at 24-25.
42. ADVISORY COMM'N ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, supra note 9,
at 125.
43. NATIONAL COMM'N ON URBAN PROBLEMS, BUILDING THE AMERICAN

CITY 30 (1968).
44. GRAHAM, JR., supra note 2, at 220.
45. ROME, supra note 22, at 236-37.
46. LYDAY, supra note 23, at 6-7.
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President Nixon wanted to respond with his own bill, which
he believed should be less reliant on planning and more insistent
on state regulation,4 7 both to protect lands of regional value and to
assist development that was necessary for a region but thought
undesirable by local constituents. 48 The President directed his
Chief of Staff for Domestic Policy, John Ehrlichman, to handle the
bill.49 Ehrlichman in turn told CEQ Chairman, Russell Train, to
come up with an alternative to the Jackson bill; but even working
with his talented staff members, Bill Reilly and Boyd Gibbons,50
"Train struggled to craft his own proposal."1
One of CEQ's first strategies was to publicize the various
innovative regulations that some states were already undertaking
to reduce local autonomy in land use decision making. 52 In 1971, it
published a study of interesting state legislation relating to land
use, which showed that some states were already using a variety
of means to achieve state land use objectives. 53 Citing this study in
support, the Nixon administration proposed its own National Land
Use Policy Act of 1971 that would offer federal funds to those
states that met national standards for protecting areas of critical
concern while also promoting development of regional benefit; as
an added incentive, in such states, "federal projects and activities
significantly affecting land use" would need to be consistent with
the state's program except in "cases of overriding national
interest."54 This kind of consistency standard was a prominent
feature of President Nixon's soon-to-be-adopted Coastal Zone
Management Act.55
Meanwhile, the White House became preoccupied with other
matters. The President was campaigning for reelection in 1972,
and land use policy was not one of the hot button issues.5 6 After
47. ROME, supra note 22, at 237.
48. COUNCIL ON ENVTL. QUALITY, supra note 27, at 20, 61.
49. LYDAY, supra note 23, at 25. Nixon knew that Ehrlichman had
practiced as a land use lawyer in the State of Washington. Id.
50. RUSSELL E. TRAIN, A MEMOIR 188-90 (2000).
51. FLIPPEN, supra note 37, at 116.
52. SIDNEY PLOTKIN, KEEP OUT: THE STRUGGLE FOR LAND USE CONTROL
183 (1987).
53. See generally FRED BOSSELMAN & DAVID CALLIES, THE QUIET
REVOLUTION IN LAND USE CONTROL (President's Council on Environmental
Quality, 1971) (analyzing nine land use regulations for the purpose of
determining how these government entities addressed complex land use
issues).
54. National Land Use Policy Act of 1971, H.R. 4332, S. 992, 92d Cong.
§ 106 (1971).
55. COUNCIL ON ENVTL. QUALITY, ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY: THE FOURTH
ANNUAL REPORT OF THE COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY 214 (Sept.
1973).
56. JOHN EHRLICHMAN, WITNESS TO POWER: THE NIXON YEARS 317, 325-28
(1982).

The John MarshallLaw Review

244

[45:237

easily winning a second term, President Nixon initially looked
forward to 1973 with optimism. His confidence was only mildly
disturbed by hints of economic decline and reports about a
politically-motivated burglary. In this promising environment,
John Ehrlichman thought it was time to move land use legislation
forward in Congress. He and Train met with Jackson, who agreed
to combine the administration bill and the Jackson bill, and to
hold Senate hearings.57
1972-1974
The initial Congressional hearings on land use policy were
uneventful, and Train later wrote that he was initially
disappointed that there was so little public response to the
President's National Land Use Policy proposal.58 However, the
environment had strong emotional appeal, and "[n]o member of
Congress could afford to be against a better environment."5 9
Jackson's Interior Committee was familiar with western public
lands, but had little experience with the issues of metropolitan
growth that concerned land use reform advocates, so few members
raised serious questions.60 Various amendments to the legislation
were debated in the Senate, which eventually approved a version
VII.

CONGRESSIONAL DEBATE,

of the bill in 1972.61

In the House, powerful Congressman Wayne Aspinall was
opposed to national land use policy legislation, so it went nowhere
until 1973.62 When Congressman Aspinall was defeated in the
1972 elections,. Congressman Morris Udall announced his
intention to push land use legislation in the House, which signified
to all interest groups that enactment of some form of national land
use policy bill was a real possibility.63
Not surprisingly, few local governments welcomed change. 64
As the likelihood of actual passage increased, some business
groups also began to see the proposals as having a direct impact on
their particular development opportunities, and various trade
associations opposed the bill.65 Business interests tried to utilize
the rhetoric of the rights revolution by claiming that the laws
57. LYDAY, supra note 23, at 29
58. RUSSELL E. TRAIN, POLITICS,

POLLUTION, AND PANDAS: AN
ENVIRONMENTAL MEMOIR 107 (2003).
59. ROBERT CAHN, FOOTPRINTS ON THE PLANET: A SEARCH FOR AN

ENVIRONMENTAL ETHIC 37 (1978). Cahn, a former environmental journalist
for the Christian Science Monitor, was appointed by President Nixon as a
member of the CEQ. Id.
60. PLOTKIN, supra note 52, at 169-71.
61. COUNCIL ON ENVTL. QUALITY, supra note 55, at 214-15.
62. LYDAY, supra note 23, at 32.
63. PLOTKIN, supra note 52, at 191.
64. Id. at 186.
65. ROME, supra note 22, at 245.
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would deprive them of their property rights, but the bill's lack of
specificity diluted the argument.66 Much of the concern about the
land-use bill had less to do with property rights6 7 than with the
potential federal power inherent in the discretion to give grants for
state plans. 6

Proponents of the Act were reluctant to identify specific
substantive changes in policy that its reforms would bring about,
fearing that they would antagonize opponents of those specific
policies.6 9 They insisted that their goals were merely procedural
and would bring long-range economic benefits. 70 Such benefits,
however, would be widely distributed among the general public,
making it hard for most of these prospective beneficiaries to see
any direct connection between the reforms and their daily life. 71
Senator Muskie, who had guided many of the other
environmental bills, complained that the bill was too processoriented and lacked federal policy guidance. 72 The format of the
proposed Act seemed out of sync with the "rights revolution,"
because the government would be "managing risks rather than
vindicating individual rights."7 3 If you were anti-exclusion, antisprawl, or anti-"nimby," the bill offered you no guarantee that it
would create any specific right that would end these practices.
As the year progressed, President Nixon's interest in domestic
policy issues waned even further. He found the Watergate affair
occupying more of his time as the year 1973 progressed. John
Ehrlichman resigned in April, leaving no one in the White House
who cared about domestic policy, including the President. 74 Russell
Train later wrote that Nixon never did become personally
concerned about land use issues7 5 and that the White House had
begun to send mixed signals on environmental issues as early as
mid-1971.76 As Congress began talking about impeachment, Nixon
saw conservative senators as his best hope of support, and in 1973
he withdrew his support from any meaningful land use
legislation.77 Even so, the House defeated the bill by only seven
votes.78

66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.

LYDAY, supra note 23, at 51.
ROME, supra note 22, at 245.
GRAHAM, JR., supra note 2, at 239.
PLOTKIN, supra note 52, at 173.
Id. at 185.
LYDAY, supra note 23, at 2.
PLOTKIN, supra note 52, at 184.
SUNSTEIN, supra note 1, at 29.
EHRLICHMAN, supra note 56, at 331-32.
TRAIN, supra note 58, at 106.

76. Id. at 118.
77. FLIPPEN, supra note 37, at 118.
78. LYDAY, supra note 23, at 39.
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OPEC SETS AMERICAN LAND USE POLICY

During 1972, the economy of the industrialized world was
booming and predicted to grow at a dramatic rate. But the growth
was fueled by cheap oil, and demand was catching up with
supply.7 9 "Even in the 50s, the United States depended
significantly on the world economy," but for most Americans "that
dependence was hidden from view and seemed of little direct
consequence."80 As a result, the world was becoming more
dependent on the Middle East for its petroleum. 8' The oil
producing countries had formed a cartel, the Organization of
Petroleum Exporting Countries ("OPEC"), which was beginning to
demonstrate its power in the early 1970s by forcing a series of
gradual increases in the world oil price. 82
The first oil shock came in the autumn. On October 6, 1973,
Egypt and Syria launched military operations against Israel that
took both Israel and the United States by surprise. The United
States provided munitions and other support to Israel.
Counterattacks by Israeli troops overcame the invaders and
captured territory from both Egypt and Syria. A cease-fire on
October 25 ended the military operations, but the impact on the
U.S. was determined when, on October 16, 1973, the Arab oil
ministers agreed to an oil embargo and cut in production. They
would provide oil to "friendly states" at previous levels but cut
exports to others, with the most severe cuts to the U.S.8 3
Panic struck the American consumers, most of whom were
highly dependent on their motor vehicles. As Daniel Yergin put it
in his prize-winning history of the oil business:
In the United States, the shortfall struck at fundamental beliefs in
the endless abundance of resources, convictions so deeply rooted in

the American character and experience that a large part of the
public did not even know, up until October 1973, that the United
States imported any oil at all. 84

After the Arab boycott, domestically produced crude oil that
sold for $3.00 during the 1960s rose to $9.00 in the free market.8 5
"[In a matter of months, American motorists saw retail gasoline
prices climb by 40 percent-and for reasons they did not
understand. No other price change had such visible, immediate,
79. COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISERS, ANNUAL REPORT, 1974 108 (1974).

80. Ralph

C.

Bryant

&

Lawrence

B.

Krause,

World

Economic

Interdependence, in SETTING NATIONAL PRIORITIES: AGENDA FOR THE 1980s

71, 72 (Joseph A. Pechman ed., 1980).
81. DANIEL YERGIN, THE PRIZE: THE EPIC QUEST FOR OIL, MONEY AND
POWER 567 (1991) [hereinafter PRIZE].
82. DAVID HOWARD DAVIS, ENERGY POLITICs 72-73 (1974).

83. PRIZE, supra note 81, at 607.
84. Id. at 616.
85. DAVIS, supra note 82, at 74.
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and visceral effects as that of gasoline."86
The construction industry also crashed.87 Fixed investment
slowed overall, and the stock of housing stagnated.8 8 Conservation
of energy cut projected demand, particularly for motor vehicles
and gasoline.89 Americans discovered that rising fuel costs forced
them "to think about when, where, and how they [were] going
places." 90 Adam Rome describes the effect this had on the idea of
national land use policy:
In 1973, the economy began to slump, and then the oil embargo led
to a dramatic increase in energy prices. The economic crisis quickly
changed the political situation. For the first time, the nation began
to suffer both serious inflation and rising unemployment.... As a
result, the idea of regulating development became much harder to
sell. 9'
The change of government in Iran in 1979 brought about a
92
second oil shock that again depressed the American economy,
93
and accelerated consumer attempts to cut overall use of energy.
Then, in 1986, Americans found out that Saudi Arabia could
effectively control our motor fuel prices. The Saudi's determination
to increase production was the trigger for the "third oil shock," an
unexpected price reduction, in which oil prices collapsed from over
$30 per barrel in late 1985 to $10 a few months later.9 4 The third
oil shock caused people to forget for a while how much they
depended on the cooperation of foreign governments, and they
95
flocked to purchase a new innovation, the sports utility vehicle.
American automakers loved the short-term profits that SUVs
96
offered and reduced investments in energy-efficient technologies.
The Reagan administration derided the need to worry about
energy and believed the free market would bring about the most
efficient result.9 7

86. PRIZE, supra note 81, at 616.
87. PLOTKIN, supra note 52, at 194.
88. COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISERS, ANNUAL REPORT, 1975 27-28 (1975).
89. PRIZE, supra note 81, at 718.
90. TOM VANDERBILT, TRAFFIC: WHY WE DRIVE THE WAY WE Do 165-66
(2008).

91. ROME, supra note 22, at 248.
92. Bryant & Krause, supra note 80, at 72.
93. COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISERS, ANNUAL REPORT, 1980 108-09 (1980).
94. PRIZE, supra note 81, at 750.
95. See generally KEITH BRADSHER, HIGH AND MIGHTY: THE DANGEROUS
RISE OF THE SUV (2004) (discussing the safety and environmental issues
associated with SUVs).
96. LAIN CARSON & VIJAY V. VAITHEESWARAM, ZooM: THE GLOBAL RACE TO
FUEL THE CAR OF THE FUTURE 287 (2007).
97. DANIEL YERGIN, THE QUEST: ENERGY, SECURITY, AND THE REMAKING
OF THE MODERN WORLD 531-33 (2011) [hereinafter QUEST].
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GLOBALIZATION AND LAND USE

Although the United States had no national land use policy,
American economic policy had been supporting freedom of trade
and discouraging the kind of "industrial policy" that the Saudis
were using.98 Neoclassical economic theory maintained that, if
every nation specialized in the things it could do best, then free
trade would increase global prosperity.9 9 Throughout the last half
of the twentieth century, the trend was toward "the reduction of
barriers to the free movement of goods and capital."100 Most
economists opposed "protectionism," and although pressure from
the domestic textile industry had led administrations from
Kennedy to Nixon to use voluntary agreements to try to reduce
clothing imports, these efforts had little impact.10o
The oil shocks of the 1970s raised issues about potential
protection for an even more powerful industry, automotive

manufacturing. Japan adopted a highly successful industrial
policy that promoted exports, including automobiles: in 1954 U.S.
automakers produced about eighty percent of passenger cars sold
here; by the mid-70s, it was about thirty-five percent. 102 Japanese
automakers were best prepared to respond to the oil shocks of the
'70s, because, in oil-deprived Japan, high fuel prices were a longterm fact of life, so their cars contributed to a forty percent
improvement in fuel efficiency between 1978 and 1987.103 Even

though the value of the dollar to the yen declined in 1978 to about
half of its 1971 value, 104 Japan significantly constrained
manufacturing in the United States by promoting efficient
manufacture of small motor vehicles.10 5
No country presented more of a challenge to international
trade and monetary arrangements in the 1970s and 1980s than
Japan. Japan tested the support for free trade in many important
sectors of the world economy by adopting a national industrial
policy based on exports, not only for cars, but for a wide range of
products.1 06 By the late seventies Japanese firms dominated
industries as varied as steel, watches, radios, motorcycles, optics,

98. COUNCIL OF EcoN. ADVISERS, supra note 88, at 33.
99. THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN, THE WORLD IS FLAT 263-64 (2007).
100. ROBERT Z. ALIBER, THE NEW INTERNATIONAL MONEY GAME 186 (7th ed.
2011).
101. WILLIAM DIEBOLD, JR., INDUSTRIAL POLICY AS AN INTERNATIONAL
ISSUE 99-104 (1980).
102. Id. at 161.

103. CARSON, supra note 96, at 24.
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2012]

The Twilight of National Land Use Policy

249

and ships, in addition to automobiles. 0
Today it is the policies of India and China that are testing
continued American support of free trade. India has had
significant success in encouraging outsourcing of many jobs in a
wide range of the high-tech service industries that are growing
rapidly worldwide. 0 8 With processes such as financial advice,
equity research, and patent filing all being performed from India,
the range and complexity of services being offered from India is
many
becoming ever more complex.109 For example,
pharmaceutical and biotechnology companies have chosen India
for research facilities.11 0
Today, however, concern about China's industrial policies has
dominated American discussion."' Since the early 1980s the
annual rate of economic growth in China has averaged a
remarkable ten percent. 112 China has adopted a currency policy
that threatens to monopolize many types of manufacturing,113 and
has led to a shift away from manufacturing in the United States
and other traditional industrial countries.11 4 Economist Robert
Aliber points out that China has mimicked the export-led policies
adopted earlier by Japan and South Korea. The thrust of these
policies was to maintain a low value for the currency and wages so
that exports would grow at a rapid rate.115
Canada has also adopted an industrial policy to promote
exports of its extensive reserves of bitumen from the oil sands of
Northern Alberta." 6 American policymakers must now weigh the
security advantages of getting oil supplies from a friendly
neighboring country against complicity in the impacts on ecology
and climate that are caused by destruction of boreal forest and
related watersheds on our own continent.117 If the United States
were to adopt a policy not to import bitumen, however, then
Canadian companies are eager to build pipelines to the coast of
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British Columbia and ship the oil to Asian markets.118
American policy continues to support free trade and free
markets-important and valid goals-but is anything resembling
a free world market feasible in a globalized economy made up of
nations that promote their own industrial policies? Nations will
need to develop their own policies incrementally to respond to each
other and hope that they have the natural resources and brains to
make their policies effective.
X. CONCLUSION: THE NIXON YEARS REVISITED
Will history remember President Nixon for the environmental
legislation that passed during his first term? In retrospect, people
who worked with the president thought that he had little personal
interest in environmental issues. 119 But he apparently sensed that
a new attitude toward land was taking hold across the nation, 120
and he wanted to be seen as an activist who was doing something
backed by a high purpose.121
But the decision to tape conversations in his private office
probably doomed Nixon's hope for history's acclaim. Nixon was
wholly involved with the Watergate investigations in 1973.122 The

release of the tapes showed how petty the president's personal
views were, and how they occupied his mind to the exclusion of
domestic policy issues.
The administration's inability to resolve the energy crisis
added to President Nixon's Watergate-induced unpopularity.123
After Nixon's resignation, President Ford pointed to "the energy
crisis [ofj last winter" as proof that "we cannot achieve all our
environmental and all our energy and economic goals at the same
time.

...

The need to move toward greater self-sufficiency in

energy is one of the major challenges of the decade ahead ... " 124
Would a National Land Use Policy Act have made a
difference? In retrospect, neither the public nor the private sector
of the U.S. economy is as powerful today as it was in 1973, and
their ability to establish policy has diminished. All levels of
American government are coping with foreign governments'
policies that limit our options. Any national land use policy would
118. Chips Cummins & Edward Welsch, CanadiansPush New Routes for
Oil, WALL ST. J. ONLINE, Nov. 25, 2011, http://online.wsj.com/
article/SB10001424052970204517204577046304089844464.html.
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have been unsuccessful in the modern world unless it was
continually adaptable to change.

